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a b s t r a c t
Worry-prone individuals have less residual working memory capacity during worry compared to low-
worriers (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008). People typically worry in verbal form, and the present study
investigated whether verbal worry depletes working memory capacity more than worry in imagery-
based form. High and low-worriers performed a working memory task, random interval generation,
whilst thinking about a worry in verbal or imagery form. High (but not low) worriers had less available
working memory capacity when worrying in verbal compared to imagery-based form. The ﬁndings could
not be accounted for by general attentional control, amount of negatively-valenced thought, or appraisals
participants made about worry topics. The ﬁndings indicate that the verbal nature of worry is implicated
in the depletion of working memory resources during worry among high-worriers, and point to the
potential value of imagery-based techniques in cognitive-behavioural treatments for problematic worry.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd.
Worry is characterized by repetitive intrusive negative thoughts
about future events. Excessive and uncontrollable worry is a hall-
mark feature of generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), a disorder
associated with chronic cognitive, social and occupational impair-
ment (Kessler et al., 1994). High-worriers can be distinguished from
low-worriers by perceived, and actual, uncontrollability of worri-
some intrusions (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983).
We have previously suggested that basic cognitive processes may
be implicated in this uncontrollability of problematic worry
(Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 2009).
Research has shown that anxiety is associated with reduced
attentional control and working memory capacity (Derryberry &
Reed, 2002; Eysenck, 1979; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). According to
the model proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974), working
memory is a limited-capacity resource comprised of an attentional
control system (Engle & Kane, 2004), referred to as the central
executive; and two subsidiary systems (for verbal and visual
information). Eysenck and Calvo (1992) suggest that worry is
responsible for the detrimental effect of anxiety on working
memory, and executive functioning in particular. These proposals
have been supported in a number of experimental (Crowe,
Matthews, & Walkenhorst, 2007; Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998;
MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993; Rapee, 1993; Richards, French,
Keogh, & Carter, 2000) and neuroimaging studies (Collette & Van
der Linden, 2002; Santos, Wall, & Eysenck, submitted for
publication). Rapee (1993) asked undergraduates to perform one
of four tasks whilst simultaneously engaging in worry. The
frequency of worry-related thoughts experienced during these
phases was compared to the frequency reported when participants
were engaging in worry without a second task. Two of the tasks
assessed the central executive and either verbal (random genera-
tion of letters) or visuo-spatial processing (pressing buttons in
a random pattern). The other two tasks tapped visuo-spatial
(repeatedly pressing buttons in a particular pattern) or verbal
(repeating the same letter) processing, but did not utilise the central
executive. Only random generation of letters interfered with ability
to worry, providing support for the proposal that worry is a verbal
process that interferes with executive functioning. Hayes et al.
(2008) directly assessed residual working memory capacity during
worry. High (but not low) worriers showed more evidence of
restricted working memory capacity during worry than when
thinking about a positive topic. The authors concluded that
depleted working memory resources during worry may be relevant
to the persistence and perceived uncontrollability of worry. It may
be that worry, once initiated, consumes working memory capacity.
Inhibition of automatic responses and task switching (or ‘mental set
shifting’) are both understood to be executive functions of working
memory (Baddeley, 1966; Miyake et al., 2000). If worry depletes
working memory, there may be less available working memory
capacity to inhibit worrisome thoughts and shift to a more benign
topic, maintaining the worry process (Hayes & Hirsch, 2007).
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1 Of those excluded from the High-Worry Group, nine were excluded on the basis
of difﬁculty engaging in imagery-based mentation, and three on the basis of verbal
mentation. Four low-worriers were excluded due to difﬁculties engaging in
imagery, and seven on the basis of verbal mentation. Fisher’s Exact Tests did not
indicate signiﬁcant differences in the number of those excluded from the imagery
or verbal condition, or the high and low-worry groups.
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(Bergman & Craske, 2000; Freeston, Dugas, & Ladoucer, 1996) and
people with clinical levels of worry tend to worry in verbal form
more than non-clinical volunteers (Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Hirsch,
Hayes, Mathews, Perman, & Borkovec, submitted for publication).
Borkovec and colleagues (Borkovec, Alcaine & Behar, 2004; Sibrava
& Borkovec, 2006) proposed that verbal worry serves a cognitive
avoidance function in response to threatening and distressing
information (such as images). In keeping with this are cognitive-
behavioural approaches that encourage individuals to engage in
coping imagery rather than verbal worry (Borkovec, Newman,
Pincus, & Lytle, 2002). In line with the proposal that verbal worry
functions to avoid distressing information such as images, Butler,
Wells and Dewick (1992) found that participants asked to worry
about a distressing ﬁlm clip they had watched (of an accident at
work) reported less anxiety immediately after the worry period
compared to those who had been asked to think about it images.
Importantly however, the individuals who had engaged in worry
actually experienced more intrusive images about the ﬁlm over the
next few days than those who had engaged in imagery. This ﬁnding
was replicated byWells and Papageorgiou (1995). In a recent study
by Stokes and Hirsch (2010) high-worriers were trained to engage
in either verbal or imagery-based mentation about a personally
relevant worry topic. Verbal worry was found to result in an
increase in negative thought intrusions after the worry period. In
contrast, imagery led to a decrease in negative intrusions. The
authors conclude that the predominantly verbal nature of worry is
implicated in the maintenance of worry.
The verbal mentation that characterizes worry, and particularly
the worry of those with GAD, appears to maintain distressing
intrusive thoughts and images, and therefore the worry process.
Imagery, in contrast, does not seem to have this effect. One
hypothesis is that verbally-based worry depletes available working
memory capacity to a greater extent than worry in imagery-based
form, leaving less resources available to inhibit or switch away from
worrisome thoughts. Alternatively, it could be argued that high-
worriers are ‘well-practised’ in verbal worry, and somight consume
less capacity, as with expert performance acquired through
extended practice (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). In this way verbal
worry would be expected to deplete working memory to a lesser
extent than worry in imagery, with no such effect among low-
worriers.
The current study aimed to explore the effect of verbal worry on
residual working memory capacity compared to imagery-based
worry among people with high and low levels of worry. Consistent
with the study of Hayes et al. (2008), we employed Baddeley’s
(1966) dual-task method. Performance on a concurrent task
(random generation) was used to measure residual working
memory capacity whilst high and low-worriers engaged in verbal
or imagery-based worry. Generating random sequences require
high levels of attentional monitoring and control (Baddeley, 1986)
to overcome the tendency to produce sequences that are well
practiced (e.g. ascending or descending series). To the extent that
limited working memory resources are consumed by other tasks
(e.g. worry), the generated output is less random (Baddeley, Emslie,
Kolodny, & Duncan, 1998).
Vandierendonck, De Vooght, and Van der Goten (1998)
proposed a version of the random generation task in which
participants tap a key at random intervals in time. Random interval
generation (RIG) utilises central executive resources with minimal
loading on verbal or visuo-spatial processes (Stuyven & Van der
Goten, 1995; Vandierendonck, 2000; Vandierendonck, Kemps,
Fastame, & Szmalec, 2004). Using the dual-task method, this RIG
task allows evaluation of the comparable effect of verbal and
imagery-based mentation on working memory. The current studydeveloped and validated a method of analysing the data from this
RIG task to derive widely used outcome measures (Towse & Neil,
1998).
In order to explore whether there were differences in perfor-
mance on the RIG task when participants were not engaged in
worry, high and low-worriers also completed the RIG task without
a concurrent task. High-worriers report more negatively-valenced
thought in general during worry compared to low-worriers, who
typically report more neutral thoughts (Mathews & Milroy, 1994).
They have also been found to appraise their worries more nega-
tively than low-worriers (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992), and to endorse
poorer attentional control in general than low-worriers (Pruzinsky
& Borkovec, 1990). Participants were asked to rate thought valence
during the experimental period, appraisals of their worries, and to
complete a questionnaire designed to assess self-reported general
attentional control, in order to rule out the possibility that these
factors underpinned the hypothesized differences in working
memory.
The aim of the study was to directly compare the effect of worry
in imagery and verbal-linguistic form on residual working memory
capacity among high and low-worriers. It was hypothesized that
high-worriers would have less residual working memory capacity
when engaged in verbal compared to imagery-based worry, which
would not be accounted for by appraisals of worries, amount of
negative content, nor self-reported general attentional control.Method
Design
High and low-worry groups underwent a baseline RIG phase
which comprised the single RIG task. This was followed by Imagery
or Verbal Conditions which participants underwent in counter-
balanced order (within groups). These comprised: a mentation
training phase when participants received training in verbal
thought or imagery; a worry focus phase, when participants
focused on a worry in verbal thought or imagery; and a worry test
phase when participants completed the RIG task whilst continuing
to focus on their worry in the designated mentation style.Participants
Seventy-eight participants from King’s College London were
selected based on scores on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire
(PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). Those scoring
above 55 were included in the high-worry group (Molina &
Borkovec, 1994) and below 43 in the low-worry group (Gillis,
Haaga, & Ford, 1995).
Seven participants were excluded as they reported that their
thoughts about the worry topic (in either condition) were more than
50% positive. Twenty-three participants were excluded as they were
not successful in worrying in the designated mentation type (less
than 50% images in the imagery condition or words in the verbal
condition, with no signiﬁcant differences in the number of those
excluded from the imagery or verbal condition, or the high and low-
worry groups1). There were no signiﬁcant differences between those
included and excluded from the study in overall attentional control,
2 Different examples were used for the imagery and verbal mentation style
training. On piloting it was found that imagery-based mentation of ‘friendship’ did
not facilitate learning that processing style but imagery-based mentation of
‘preparing dinner’ did. In contrast, verbally thinking about ‘preparing dinner’ did
not facilitate that processing style, whereas verbal mentation of ‘friendship’ did.
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nor with respect to age, gender, STAI-T, or PSWQ scores.
In the ﬁnal sample, there were 24 participants in the low-worry
group (PSWQ:M¼ 30.50, SD¼ 7.19), and 24 in the high-worry group
(M ¼ 63.46, SD ¼ 5.18). Half the high-worry group and none of the
low-worriers scored above cut-off on the Generalised Anxiety
Disorder Questionnaire-IV (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002), with
a signiﬁcant group difference (c2(1) ¼ 16.00, p < .01). The groups
differed on the trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI-T; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970): low-worriers
reported signiﬁcantly less anxiety (M ¼ 32.75, SD ¼ 5.93) compared
to high-worriers (M¼ 52.92, SD¼ 7.67; t(46)¼ 10.19, p< .01), and on
the Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 2002), with
low-worriers endorsinghigher attentional control compared to high-
worriers (M¼ 56.79 [SD¼ 8.12] vs.M¼45.13 [SD¼ 6.51]; t(46)¼ 5.47,
p < .01). There were no signiﬁcant gender differences between
groups, with 20 female high-worriers and 14 female low-worriers
(c2(1)¼ 3.63, ns), nor were there signiﬁcant age differences between
high and low-worry groups (M ¼ 25.57 [SD ¼ 10.37] vs. M ¼ 27.69
[SD ¼ 10.90]; t(46) ¼ 0.69, ns).
Self-report questionnaires
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990)
consists of 16 statements about worry rated on a scale from1 (not at
all typical of me) to 5 (very typical of me), (total scores ranging:
16e80).
The Trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T;
Spielberger et al., 1970) assesses how anxious individuals feel in
general (scores ranging: 20e80).
The GAD-Q-IV (Newman et al., 2002) is a diagnostic instrument
for GAD based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-Fourth
Edition (DSM-IV, 1994). The categorical scoring systemwas used in
the present study (Newman et al., 2002) to indicate likely GAD
diagnosis.
The Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 2002) is
a 20-item measure of attentional ability (scores ranging: 20e80),
with higher scores indicating better attentional control.
Experimental task and training
Single RIG task
The RIG task (Vandierendonck et al., 1998) involves pressing the
space bar on the keyboard approximately every second in a random
and unpredictable rhythm. Participants had a 15-s practice trial and
were given feedback on their performance, then the single RIG task
for 5 min. The time interval between key presses was recorded in
milliseconds.
Mentation style training
Participants were trained in verbal and imagery mentation
(adapted from Stokes & Hirsch, 2010). To train participants to engage
in imagery, they were asked to: “generate an image of the situation
and tune in to what you can see, feel, smell, hear and taste in the
image as though you are actually there right now”. Then in keeping
with Holmes and Mathews (2005), participants were helped to
imagine cutting a lemon. They undertook a further practice imagery
exercise, in which they were asked to imagine cooking dinner.
Participants gave feedback after each exercise on the extent towhich
they had been able to engage in imagery. If necessary, they were
provided with further feedback on how to generate imagery. The
training for participants in the verbal condition followed a similar
procedure, except that participants were asked to think “in words,
sentences and questions, as though you are talking to yourself”.
Again, the experimenter gave the example of thinking about cuttinga lemon in words and sentences. Participants were then asked to
practice by thinking in verbal form about the topic of “friendship” for
1 min2.
Mood ratings
State mood was assessed a number of times. Anxiety and
depression were rated on 100 mm visual analogue scales (VAS),
ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘extremely’. A measure of the change in
anxiety over the worry test phase, termed ‘anxiety reactivity’ was
calculated (based on these VAS ratings taken at various time points)
for later analysis. This was done by ﬁrst determining the change in
anxiety over the test phase for each condition: [anxiety rating post-
worry test phase e anxiety rating pre-worry test phase], then
calculating the difference across the two conditions: [imagery
anxiety reactivitye verbal anxiety reactivity]. The same was done
for depression ratings.
Worry ratings
Worry topics were rated on three 100 mm VAS to measure how
‘Concerning’, ‘Personally Relevant’, and ‘Distressing’ they were,
from ‘not at all’ to ‘totally’ to provide Worry Content Ratings.
For Worry Topic Ratings, an assessor rated the experimenter
summary of worry topics (see Procedure below), in terms of
negativity (Low; Moderate; High), and dominant topic (Social/
Relationship; Physical; Work/Study; Financial). Inter-rater reli-
ability analysis based on a randomly selected subset of 25% of
participants showed good agreement, with full consensus for
dominant topic ratings of both worry topics and for negativity for
one worry topic (Cohen’s Kappa ¼ 1.00, p < .01), and good agree-
ment for the other worry topic (Cohen’s Kappa ¼ 0.63, p < .05).
To provide Worry Appraisal Ratings, participants were asked to
rate the worst outcome of their worry topics on three 100mmVAS:
“How likely is this to happen?”; “How catastrophic would it be?”;
and “Howwell do you think youwould copewith it?”, ranging from
‘not at all’ to ‘totally’.
Thought ratings
Participants rated the percentage of thoughts that were positive,
negative and neutral during the worry test phases. Participants
rated the extent to which they engaged in the designated menta-
tion style during the Imagery and Verbal worry test phases, using
two 100 mm VAS relating to amount of Images or Words,
depending on condition, from ‘not at all’ to ‘totally’.Procedure
Participants were randomly allocated to Imagery-Verbal or
Verbal-Imagery order within groups. Individuals completed the
PSWQ, ACS, STAI and GAD-Q-IV. Participants identiﬁed two current
worries and made Worry Content Ratings. The single RIG task fol-
lowed. Participants rated their mood to assess baseline state anxiety
and depression and then underwent verbal or imagery Mentation
Training (dependingon conditionorder). Participantswere reminded
of one of the identiﬁed worries and discussed salient aspects of it
(noted down by the experimenter), and made Worry Appraisal
Ratings. Participants focused on the worst outcome of the worry in
either images or words (depending on condition) for 5 min (‘Worry
Focus Phase’). They then continued to focus on the worry (in images
Table 1
Mean R and RNG scores of High and Low-Worry Groups in the Imagery and Verbal
Conditions (standard deviations in parentheses).
Worry group R scores RNG scores
Imagery
condition
Verbal
condition
Imagery
condition
Verbal
condition
High 29.15 (15.27) 34.62 (15.51) 0.47 (0.18) 0.53 (0.17)
Low 25.60 (10.71) 25.97 (12.66) 0.44 (0.14) 0.44 (0.17)
Note: R scores refer to redundancy scores; RNG scores refer to random number
generation scores.
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5 min (this was termed the ‘Worry Test Phase’). When the 5 min
Worry Test Phase was completed, participants rated their current
mood and then retrospectively rated their mood just prior to the
Worry Test Phase (after the Worry Focus Phase). Participants then
completed Thought Ratings in relation to the worry test phase. After
the ﬁrst condition, participants completed the Speed of Compre-
hension Test (Version A; Baddeley, Emslie, & Nimmo-Smith, 1992) as
a ﬁller task (Hayes et al., 2008). The procedure was repeated for the
other condition, with participants ﬁrst rating their mood to assess
baseline state anxiety and depression.
Analysis of RIG data
Randomness data was scored in the two ways considered the
most sensitive (Baddeley et al., 1998; Towse, 1998) and in line with
the suggestion of Towse (1998) to use more than one measure.
Redundancy (R; Attneave, 1959; Baddeley, 1966) is a measure of the
extent to which the same time intervals between key presses are
made over the testing period as a whole (ranging from 0e100).
Random Number Generation Score (RNG; Evans, 1978) reﬂects the
extent to which consecutive intervals between key presses were the
same in length (ranging 0e1). For both R and RNG scores, higher
scores reﬂect less random performance, indexing less available
workingmemory capacity. Towse andNeil (1998) provide a thorough
explanation of these measures, and the relationship between them.
R and RNG measures are calculated using RGCalc software (Towse &
Neil, 1998), which analyses discrete data, for example numbers 1e10
on a random number generation task. We devised a system to
transform data from the RIG task, which is continuous, to be analysed
with RGCalc software3, as suggested by Towse and Neil (1998).
Each participant’s dataset was a series of time intervals (time
difference between each pair of adjacent key presses), recorded
using E-prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002).
The number of data points (time intervals) varied depending on
how many key presses the participant made. To analyse the data,
a discrete dataset was generated to represent this continuous
variable of time intervals, i.e. time interval data was grouped into
a discrete set of numbered groups (termed ‘bins’). First, the time
interval data of all participants for all RIG phases (i.e. single RIG and
both RIG Test Periods) was combined to create a variable made up
of all time intervals for all participant data. This series of time
intervals was reordered, from the shortest interval to the longest.
Histograms and descriptive statistics were inspected to identify the
range and distribution of the data. The aim was to group the
responses on the basis of the length of the time interval, i.e. shorter
time intervals were groupedwith shorter time intervals, and longer
intervals with longer ones. Based on the inspection of the reordered
data, twenty interval bins were created each set at a width of
200 ms (i.e. ﬁrst bin 0e200 ms; second bin 201 mse400 ms etc.),
except the ﬁnal bin which was set at 3801 ms and above. Each
participant’s original time difference interval data was then reco-
ded into bins using this classiﬁcation system, and this data was the
discrete data analysed in RGCalc.
Results
Single RIG task
Two independent-samples t-tests were carried out on R and
RNG scores comparing high and low-worriers’ performance on the3 Piloting on real and simulated data was carried out to validate this method, and
indicated it was valid. For details please contact corresponding author.single RIG task. Groups did not signiﬁcantly differ for R scores
(t(46) ¼ 0.49, ns; M ¼ 26.54 [SD ¼ 10.45], M ¼ 25.34 [SD ¼ 10.70],
respectively) or RNG scores (t(46) ¼ 0.46, ns; M ¼ 0.47 [SD ¼ 0.13],
M ¼ 0.45 [SD ¼ 0.14], respectively). This indicates that with no
concurrent task demands, groups’ performance on the RIG task was
equivalent.
Randomness in imagery and verbal thought
A mixed MANOVA was carried out with R and RNG scores,
comparing worry group (high vs. low), and the repeated measures
factor condition (verbal vs. imagery). Mean randomness scores are
shown in Table 1.
The main effect of condition was signiﬁcant for both R
(F(1, 46) ¼ 12.18, p < .01, partial h2 ¼ 0.21) and RNG scores
(F(1, 46) ¼ 7.70, p < .01, partial h2 ¼ 0.14), with more random
performance in the imagery compared to verbal condition (R
scores: M ¼ 27.38 [SD ¼ 13.18] vs. M ¼ 30.29 [SD ¼ 14.67]; RNG
scores:M ¼ 0.46 [SD ¼ 0.16] vs.M ¼ 0.49 [SD ¼ 0.17], respectively).
There was no main effect of group for R (F(1, 46) ¼ 2.49, ns) or RNG
scores (F(1, 46) ¼ 1.30, ns). Importantly, the interaction between
condition and group was signiﬁcant for both R (F(1, 46) ¼ 9.30,
p < .01, partial h2 ¼ 0.17) and RNG scores (F(1, 46) ¼ 7.59, p < .01,
partial h2 ¼ 0.14).
Pairwise comparisons showed high-worriers were less random
in the verbal condition compared to imagery (R: t(46) ¼ 4.62,
p < .001; RNG: t(46) ¼ 4.00, p < .001), with no difference in the
low-worry group (R: t(46)<1, ns; RNG: t(46)<1, ns). High-worriers
responded less randomly than low-worriers in the verbal condition
although this was only signiﬁcant for R scores (R: t(46) ¼ 2.11,
p< .05, r¼ 0.30; RNG: t(46)¼ 1.69, ns) with no group differences in
the imagery condition, (R: t(46) ¼ 1.07, ns; RNG: t(46)<1, ns).
A MANCOVA with group and condition as factors and anxiety
reactivity as the covariate revealed the previously observed inter-
action between group and condition remained signiﬁcant for R and
RNG scores: F(1, 45)¼ 9.81, p< .01, partial h2¼ 0.18; F(1, 45)¼ 8.58,
p < .01, partial h2 ¼ 0.16, respectively. This suggests that random-
ness differences are unlikely to be due to differences in changes in
state anxiety. There was no signiﬁcant main effect of anxiety
reactivity or interactions with the covariate in the analysis with R or
RNG scores (all p > .05). Analyses with depression reactivity as
a covariate produced similar results.
Similarly, a MANCOVA with appraisals included as covariates
revealed the interaction between group and condition remained
signiﬁcant for R and RNG scores: F(1, 43) ¼ 8.85, p < .01, partial
h2 ¼ 0.17; F(1, 43) ¼ 7.31, p < .01, partial h2 ¼ 0.15, respectively. This
suggests that randomness differences are unlikely to be due to
appraisals made about the worry topics. There was no signiﬁcant
main effect of the appraisal covariates or interactions with the
covariates in the analysis with R or RNG scores (all p > .05). For
mean appraisal ratings, see Table 2.
A MANCOVAwith group and condition as factors, and percentage
of negative thoughts as a covariate showed the interaction between
Table 2
Mean appraisals of worries identiﬁed for imagery and verbal conditions made by high and low-worry groups (standard deviations in parentheses).
Worry group Imagery condition Verbal condition
Appraisals Appraisals
Catastrophic Likelihood Coping Catastrophic Likelihood Coping
High 78.29 (20.31) 35.38 (19.36) 31.21 (31.49) 75.29 (18.84) 44.71 (22.02) 36.17 (28.83)
Low 55.71 (28.56) 37.42 (21.36) 57.38 (23.20) 47.75 (28.33) 42.83 (22.51) 59.67 (23.74)
Table 4
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partial h2 ¼ 0.18; F(1, 45) ¼ 7.89, p < .01, partial h2 ¼ 0.15, for R and
RNG scores respectively, suggesting that randomness differences are
unlikely to be due to differences in reported negativity of the worry
topic. There was no signiﬁcant main effect of percentage of negative
thoughts or interactions with the covariate in the analysis with R or
RNG scores (all p > .05). Ratings of negative and neutral thought
content during the worry test periods are shown in Table 3.
Similarly, a MANCOVAwith ACS scores as the covariate revealed
the interaction between group and condition remained signiﬁcant
for R and RNG scores: F(1, 45) ¼ 8.11, p < .01, partial h2 ¼ 0.15; F(1,
45) ¼ 8.41, p < .01, partial h2 ¼ 0.16, respectively, suggesting that
randomness differences are unlikely to be due to differences in
general attentional control. There was no signiﬁcant main effect of
ACS or interactions with the covariate in the analysis with R or RNG
scores (all p > .05).
Worry topic ratings
Analyses were conducted on assessor ratings and participants’
own ratings of the two identiﬁed worries to ensure they were
equivalent. Paired t-tests comparing how currently concerning,
distressing and personally relevant participants rated the two
worries revealed no signiﬁcant differences on any of these (for all:
t < 1, ns).
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests on assessor ratings of descriptions
of the two worry topics revealed no signiﬁcant differences in terms
of the negativity (z ¼ 1.13, ns) or dominant topic (z ¼ 0.55, ns).
Mentation type in imagery and verbal conditions
Manipulation check data was investigated to ensure that
participants engaged in the designated mentation style (imagery or
verbal) to a similar extent during each condition. The mean rating
of proportion of images reported by participants (on a VAS scale
ranging from 0e100) during the imagery condition was 74.46
[SD ¼ 13.36] for high-worriers and 73.89 [SD ¼ 12.69] for low-
worriers. The mean rating of proportion of words reported by
participants (on another VAS scale ranging from 0e100) in the
verbal conditionwas 76.58 [SD¼ 14.08] for high-worriers and 77.54
[SD ¼ 16.97] for low-worriers.
An ANOVA was carried out to assess whether high and low-
worriers were equally successful in engaging in imagery and verbal
mentation styles. The ANOVA compared amount of mentation in the
designated style (be that words or images) between group andTable 3
Percentage of negative and neutral worry content reported by high and low-worry
groups in the imagery and verbal conditions (standard deviations in parentheses).
Worry group Imagery condition Verbal condition
Thought valence Thought valence
Negative Neutral Negative Neutral
High 71.96 (19.38) 16.25 (18.61) 69.33 (17.90) 13.89 (11.48)
Low 58.33 (26.73) 30.42 (24.40) 55.00 (23.82) 27.92 (23.50)condition. This revealed no signiﬁcantmain effect of group (F< 1, ns)
or condition (F(1, 46) ¼ 1.07, ns), or interaction (F < 1, ns). This
suggests that high and low-worriers reported an equivalent amount
ofwords in the verbal condition and images in the imagerycondition.State mood at condition baseline and across the test periods
Mean mood ratings of state anxiety at condition baselines and
before and after the worry test period are shown in Table 4. A mixed
ANOVAwas conducted comparingmood ratings (for anxiety ratings)
across worry groups, conditions, and time (condition baseline, and
before and after the worry test phase). This revealed a signiﬁcant
effect of group (F(1, 46)¼ 17.12, p< .01, partial h2¼ 0.82), with high-
worriers reporting more anxiety at all time points compared to low-
worriers (M ¼ 48.04 [SD ¼ 26.00] vs.M ¼ 26.62 [SD ¼ 21.50]). There
was a signiﬁcant effect of time (F(2, 92) ¼ 16.92, p < .01, partial
h2¼ 0.50). Pairwise comparisons indicated that state anxiety ratings
before and after the worry test phase did not signiﬁcantly differ
(p ¼ ns), but both differed signiﬁcantly from anxiety rated at
condition baseline (p < .01 for both). There was no signiﬁcant effect
of condition (F(1, 46) ¼ 0.04, p ¼ ns), or signiﬁcant interaction
between condition and group(F(1, 46) ¼ 3.66, p ¼ ns), time and
group (F(1, 46) ¼ 0.04, p ¼ ns), condition and time(F(2, 92) ¼ 2.67,
p ¼ ns), or condition, time and group (F(2, 92) ¼ 0.52, p ¼ ns).Discussion
For the ﬁrst time, this study demonstrated that high-worriers
have less residual working memory capacity when worrying in
verbal form compared to imagery, whilst low-worriers do not differ
across mentation type. In line with previous research, high-
worriers showed poorer general attentional control (Derryberry &
Reed, 2002), more negative thoughts during worry (Mathews &
Milroy, 1994), more negative appraisals about worry topics (Vasey
& Borkovec, 1992), and more anxious state mood compared to
low-worriers (Borkovec et al., 1983). However, none of these factors
accounted for the difference in working memory depletion across
mentation type among high-worriers. Furthermore, high and low-
worriers showed no difference in their performance on the RIG task
when not engaged in worry.
Anxiety did not differ following worry in verbal or imagery form
in either group. This is in contrast to some studies (Butler et al.,State anxiety ratings reported by high and low-worry groups at condition baseline,
and pre and post the worry test phases (standard deviations in parentheses).
Time point High-worry group Low-worry group
Imagery
condition
Verbal
condition
Imagery
condition
Verbal
condition
Condition
baseline
34.71 (25.62) 42.50 (23.65) 17.03 (18.97) 15.50 (17.57)
Pre-worry
test phase
55.75 (24.49) 53.33 (23.24) 36.42 (22.44) 31.63 (20.15)
Post-worry
test phase
48.63 (26.69) 53.33 (28.21) 30.50 (22.01) 27.54 (23.02)
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possibility is that the retrospective ratings of mood in the present
study, used to minimise disruption of the worry process, may have
been a less sensitive method of assessing state mood. However,
increasingly ﬁndings are mixed regarding the impact of mentation
style on self-reported mood; for example Merckelbach and
colleagues (Merckelbach, Dijkstra, de Jong, & Muris, 1994) found no
differences in subjectively or objectively recorded emotional reac-
tivity when participants engaged in verbal or imagery-based pro-
cessing. Neither Stokes and Hirsch (2010) nor Hirsch, Perman,
Mathews, and Hayes (in preparation) found differences in state
mood across imagery and verbal mentation. Both of these studies
and the present study asked participants to focus on personal,
current worry topics. In contrast, participants in the studies of
Butler and colleagues (1992) and Wells and Papageorgiou (1995)
engaged in worry or imagery about a novel ﬁlm clip. Similarly, in
the study of Holmes and Mathews (2005), participants were asked
to focus on novel scenarios. It may be that mentation about a novel
stimulus has a different effect on state mood compared towhen the
topic is personally relevant and familiar, as is the case with one’s
own worries. Further research is needed to clarify the impact of
mentation style on state mood.
Of note is the number of participants who were excluded for
failing to engage in either/both mentation styles sufﬁciently.
Importantly, approximately equal numbers were excluded from the
two worry groups and from the two conditions, and there were no
differences between those excluded and included on question-
naires or demographic characteristics. Further research could
usefully develop the training procedures for mentation styles and it
may be that enhanced training would lead to fewer participants
being excluded. Given that individuals with problematic worry
endorse an even greater predominance of verbal mentation in their
worry (Hirsch et al., in preparation) enhancing training procedures
for imagery mentation may be particularly important to consider
for individuals with GAD. This will be valuable both in the context
of further experimental studies and also for clinical interventions,
such as those cognitive-behavioural interventions that incorporate
imagery techniques (e.g. Borkovec et al., 2002).
The experimental manipulation was validated on the basis of
participants’ ratings of the proportion of their worrisome thoughts
that were in the designated mentation style. Of those participants
included in the present study, ratings were comparable to those
reported in a study comparing verbal thought and imagery among
people with insomnia (Nelson & Harvey, 2002). In future studies it
would be useful to include a measure of the proportion of worri-
some thoughts in both mentation styles (i.e. words during the
imagery condition and images during the verbal condition) to
further validate the manipulation.
The study was carried out with a non-clinical sample and
therefore cautionmust be taken inmaking generalisations about the
ﬁndings. However, half the high-worriers were above the recom-
mended cut-off on the GAD-Q-IV, indicating that they may meet
criteria for GAD diagnosis. This suggests that this ﬁndingmight also
apply to a clinical population and it would be valuable and inter-
esting to investigate the impact of verbal and imagerymentation on
working memory capacity among individuals with GAD.
The present study has built on previous research indicating
that reduced working memory capacity is associated with worry
among high-worriers, with the ﬁnding that this is speciﬁcally
dependent on the type of mentation style. This is in line with the
recent ﬁnding of Stokes and Hirsch (2010) that high-worriers
report more negative thought intrusions after a period of
instructed verbal worry compared to imagery-based worry. But
what is particularly unhelpful about the verbal mentation that
characterizes typical worry and what is helpful about imagery?Self-report studies have found that verbal mentation tends to be
less speciﬁc or concrete than imagery (Stöber, 1998), associated
with “what if” type of thoughts. This lack of speciﬁcity is thought
to impede problem-solving (Stöber, Tepperwien, & Staak, 2000)
and emotional processing (Philippot, Baeyens, & Douilliez, 2006;
Philippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, 2003), thereby maintaining the
worry process. Watkins (2008) argued that abstract processing
that characterizes repetitive negative verbal thought (including
worry) perpetuates negative mood, in contrast to a more helpful
concrete mode (such as that associated with imagery), which is
also associated with more effective problem-solving and
emotional processing (Philippot et al., 2003; Stöber, 1998; Watkins
& Moulds, 2005).
The functions of working memory include inhibition and
switching of attention (Baddeley, 1966; Miyake et al., 2000), and it
may be that when engaged in typical (i.e. verbal) worry, high-
worriers are then less able to shift away or stop worries, and also
less able to problem-solve effectively. In contrast to verbal
mentation, our ﬁndings indicate that when high-worriers imagine
aworry topic, residual workingmemory resources are equivalent to
that of low-worriers. We have suggested that working memory is
required for inhibiting or shifting away fromworrisome intrusions.
In this way imagining a worry instead of verbally thinking about it
may be helpful in interrupting the worry process. This provides
tentative support for therapeutic interventions that incorporate
imagery-based techniques (Borkovec et al., 2002).
A ﬁnal and important question is why is the detrimental effect of
verbal over imagery-based worry only found among high-
worriers? People with high levels of anxiety or worry show
cognitive biases towards threat (Hayes & Hirsch, 2007), making
them more likely to detect threat and to interpret ambiguous
stimuli in a threatening way. These biases require information
storage and processing (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo,
2007), which are functions of working memory (Engle & Kane,
2004). The working memory capacity of high-worriers is depleted
by these information-processing biases compared to low-worriers,
who showmore benign biases (Hayes & Hirsch, 2007). In support of
this, Hirsch et al. (2009) found that high-worriers who had
undergone benign interpretation training subsequently showed
greater residual working memory capacity whilst worrying
compared to a control group of high-worriers. It may be that the
relatively greater demand of verbal (compared to imagery-based)
worry on working memory capacity is particularly unhelpful for
high-worriers, because their resources are already depleted (by
cognitive biases), leading to the persistence of worry.
In summary, the study has demonstrated that among high-
worriers, verbally-based worry has a particularly detrimental effect
on working memory resources compared to imagery mentation.
Whilst future research is needed to explore whether this effect is
present among a clinical population, the ﬁndings implicate verbal
mentation in the persistence of problematic worry. In contrast,
imagery-based mentation does not appear to deplete available
working memory resources to the same extent. The ﬁndings add to
the growing evidence base pointing to the potential beneﬁts of
engaging in imagery-based mentation for people with high levels
of worry.Acknowledgements
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